A New World Order

In many cases we open our discussion with something of a disclaimer: consider the source. In this case I recommend that we not consider the source.

The source of this recent lecture about the conflict in Ukraine is Brookings scholar Fiona Hill. You will recall that Hill testified against President Trump during his impeachment proceedings, thus appearing to be a partisan actor. And the Brookings Institute is obviously a liberal think tank. On the other hand, Hill was previously a Trump administration official.

And yet, in the world of strategic analysis of the shifting tectonics of world politics and the clash of civilizations, we are always on the lookout for an intelligent survey of what is going on. We have long since been disabused of the notion that our media is providing an objective survey of the facts or even a fair analysis of the situation at hand.

In what has become a propaganda war over Ukraine, this is even more obvious. As that country becomes increasingly reduced to a pile of rubble, our sage commenters tell us that everything is going swimmingly for the country’s fearless and slightly reckless president. And yet, we also know that next year is an election year and it behooves our Democratic propaganda media to show how great things are under our demented president. Thus, if you cannot consider Fiona Hill the best source, the alternatives in the media are far worse.

As opposed to many others Hill considers the Ukraine conflict, not in terms of defending democracy against autocracy, but as a worldwide rebellion against American hegemony, to say nothing of American arrogance. So, the conflict defies the old world order and attempts to midwife something else. Clearly, it has not arrived at a new configuration, but it is a work in progress.

Hill writes:

This has not, as Vladimir Putin and others claim, become a proxy war between the United States or the “collective West” (the U.S. and its European and other allies) against Russia. In the current geopolitical arena, the war is now effectively the reverse—a proxy for a rebellion by Russia and the “Rest” against the United States. The war in Ukraine is perhaps the event that makes the passing of pax Americana apparent to everyone.

Countries around the world have tired of feeling pushed around by America, of having the terms of their relationship imposed from Washington. Ironically, in a war that is supposed for democracy, these countries want to have a say in their own foreign policies. And we should not ignore the increasing economic power of China:

It is not just Russia that seeks to push the United States to the sidelines in Europe, and China that wants to minimize and contain U.S. military and economic presence in Asia so both can secure their respective spheres of influence. Other countries that have traditionally been considered “middle powers” or “swing states”—the so-called “Rest” of the world—seek to cut the U.S. down to a different size in their neighborhoods and exert more influence in global affairs. They want to decide, not be told what’s in their interest. In short, in 2023, we hear a resounding no to U.S. domination and see a marked appetite for a world without a hegemon.

In part, it seems that the United States has overplayed its hand in various conflicts around the world. It has mistaken its own interest for the interest of the international community. While Hill emphasizes moral authority, we will add that countries around the world are more and more economically dependent on Russia and China. Economic hegemony grants a certain amount of prestige, not to mention power:

Since 1991, the U.S. has seemingly stood alone as the global superpower. But today, after a fraught two-decade period shaped by American-led military interventions and direct engagement in regional wars, the Ukraine war highlights the decline of the United States itself. This decline is relative economically and militarily, but serious in terms of U.S. moral authority. Unfortunately, just as Osama bin Laden intended, the U.S.’s own reactions and actions have eroded its position since the devastating terrorist attacks of 9/11. “America fatigue” and disillusionment with its role as the global hegemon is widespread. This includes in the United States itself—a fact that is frequently on display in Congress, news outlets and think tank debates. For some, the U.S. is a flawed international actor with its own domestic problems to attend to. For others, the U.S. is a new form of imperial state that ignores the concerns of others and throws its military weight around.

As for the stability and viability of the American economy, this remains to be seen. Clearly, many countries are seriously doubting America’s ability to dig itself out of the debt hole it has put itself in. 

Some part of the debate involves past American behavior, behavior that is being criticized because we nearly go it alone:

Ukraine is essentially being punished by guilt through association for having direct U.S. support in its effort to defend itself and liberate its territory. Indeed, in some international and American domestic forums, discussions about Ukraine quickly degenerate into arguments about U.S. past behavior. Russia’s actions are addressed in a perfunctory fashion. “Russia is only doing what the U.S. does,” is the retort … Yes, Russia overturned the fundamental post-1945 principle of the prohibition against war and the use of force enshrined in Article 2 of the UN Charter … But, the U.S. already damaged this principle when it invaded Iraq 20 years ago.

Apparently, the developing world does not see us as quite the moral actors we consider ourselves to be:

In the so-called “Global South,” and what I am loosely referring to as the “Rest” (of the world), there is no sense of the U.S. as a virtuous state. Perceptions of American hubris and hypocrisy are widespread. Trust in the international system(s) that the U.S. helped invent and has presided over since World War II is long gone. Elites and populations in many of these countries believe that the system was imposed on them at a time of weakness when they were only just securing their independence. 

And many of these countries in the Global South were none too happy with the way the Biden administration rallied the West to fight a proxy war in Ukraine. Apparently, fighting a proxy war-- with mercenaries-- does not label you as courageous. 

Non-Western elites share the same belief as some Western analysts that Russia was provoked or pushed into war by the United States and NATO expansion. They resent the power of the U.S. dollar and Washington’s frequent punitive use of financial sanctions. They were not consulted by the U.S. on this round of sanctions against Russia. They see Western sanctions constraining their energy and food supplies and pushing up prices. They blame Russia’s Black Sea blockade and deliberate disruption of global grain exports on the United States—not on the actual perpetrator, Vladimir Putin. They point out that no-one pushed to sanction the United States when it invaded Afghanistan and then Iraq, even though they were opposed to U.S. intervention, so why should they step up now?

And many countries do not want to get caught in a conflict between China and America. They fear they will lose their own ability to pursue their own interests and their being forced to take sides:

Most countries—including many in Europe—reject the current U.S. framing of a new “Great Power Competition”—a geopolitical tug-of-war between the United States and China. States and elites bristle at the U.S. idea that “you are either with us or against us,” or you are “on the right or wrong side of history” in an epic struggle of democracies versus autocracies. Few outside Europe accept this definition of the war in Ukraine or the geopolitical stakes. They don’t want to be assigned to new blocs that are artificially imposed, and no-one wants to be caught in a titanic clash between the United States and China. In contrast to the U.S., as well as others like Japan, South Korea and India, most countries do not see China as a direct military or security threat. They may have serious qualms about China’s rough economic and political behavior and its blatant abuse of human rights, but they still see China’s value as a trading and investment partner for their future development. The United States and the European Union don’t offer sufficient alternatives for countries to turn away from China, including in the security realm—and even within Europe the sense of how much is at stake for individual countries in the larger international system and in relations with China varies.

Right or wrong, the analysis deserves to be considered.